A longstanding open problem is that of how to get high quality statistics through direct queries to databases containing information about individuals without revealing information specific to those individuals. Diffix is a new framework for anonymous database query that adds noise based on the filter conditions in the query. A previous paper described Diffix for a simplified query semantics. This paper extends that description to include a wide variety of common features found in SQL. It describes attacks associated with various features, and the anonymization steps used to defend against those attacks. This paper describes the version of Diffix used for bounty program sponsored by Aircloak starting December 2017.
Introduction
Diffix is a new approach to anonymized database query that adds noise to answers, but does so in a way that takes into account the filter conditions of the query. In doing so, it minimizes the amount of noise needed to strongly protect the anonymity of individuals in the database, and eliminates the need for the budget that is found in systems based on differential privacy. A previous paper [10] motivated and described Diffix as applied to a simple query language: one that allowed only the query conditions WHERE column = value and WHERE NOT column = value in a simple SQL SELECT. This paper extends the query semantics in [10] to include a wide variety of SQL features including subqueries, JOIN, GROUP BY and HAVING, LIKE, IN, and a variety of math, string, and datetime functions. In so doing, this paper substantially increases the utility of the system, but also substantially increases the size of the attack vector. This paper describes many new attacks that are possible because of the expanded semantics, and the subsequent defenses.
For the most part, this paper does not require knowledge of [10] . On occasion this paper uses text from [10] without attribution.
Note that this paper descibes the version of Diffix that was used for the bounty program sponsored by Aircloak and described at challenge.aircloak.com. This paper was previously distributed at that URL in December of 2017. This ArXiv reference may in particular be used by authors who wish to publish their attacks.
A brief history of anonymization
As early as the mid-1800's, confidentiality of individuals in the U.S. census became a concern [11] . The census bureau for instance started removing Personally Identifying Information (PII) like names and addresses from publicly available census data. Over the ensuing decades, the bureau increasingly used a variety of techniques to mitigate the possibility that micro-data or tabulated data would allow individuals in the data to be identified. These techniques include rounding, adding random noise to values, aggregation, cell suppression, cell swapping, and sampling among others [11] .
In the 1950's, the bureau started using computers to tabulate data, and by the 1960's anonymization techniques like those described above were being automated [11] . Computers introduced the ability for analysts to "cross-tabulate" data (set filter conditions on queries). This tremendously increased an analyst's ability to analyze the data, but also opened the possibility that an analyst could isolate an individual by specifying a set of query conditions that uniquely identify that individual.
For instance, suppose that an analyst happens to know the birthday, zip code, and gender of someone (the victim). Using SQL as our working query language, the analyst could generate for instance the following query: If the answer is 1, then the analyst knows that the victim is indeed the only individual in the dataset with those attributes. Given this, the analyst can learn anything else about the individual. For instance, to learn salary the analyst could make the following query:
SELECT salary, count(*) FROM table WHERE bday = '1994-02-05' AND gender = 'M' AND zip = 12345 GROUP BY salary which would return the salary of the victim. The basic defense against this, deployed in the 1960's, was to set thresholds which required that a certain number K of individuals must be present in aggregated data for the aggregate to be released. This K-threshold mechanism, however, does not prevent individuals from being isolated.
The central problem is the intersection attack. By way of example, imagine a database that only returns answers that pertain to more than K = 4 individuals. Suppose that an analyst makes two queries, one for the number of people in the CS department, and one for the number of men in the CS department:
SELECT count(*) SELECT count (*)  FROM table  FROM table  WHERE Suppose that there are 34 people in the CS department and 33 of them are men. Since both of these numbers are greater than K = 4, the database returns the answers. The analyst can trivially conclude that there is one woman in the CS department even though the database would have refused to provide that answer directly. Armed with this knowledge, the analyst can then learn more about the woman. For instance, the analyst can query for the sum of salaries of all people in the CS department and the sum of salaries of all men in the CS department, and by taking the difference determine the salary of the woman:
SELECT sum(salary) SELECT sum (salary)  FROM table  FROM table  WHERE The earliest publication we could find that identifies the intersection attack is by the statistician Fellegi in 1972 [9] . In 1979, it was shown that even an analyst with no prior knowledge about the contents of a K-threshold database that gives exact answers can infer substantial information about individual users using the intersection attack [4] . It was also shown that one way to prevent the intersection attack is to distort answers unpredictably, for instance by randomly rounding user counts up or down to a value divisible by five [9, 8] or removing random rows from the set of rows returned by the database [3] .
One problem with this approach arises if the analyst has the ability to make an unlimited number of queries to the database. If so, the analyst can remove the noise through averaging: causing a given answer to be repeated, each with a new noise sample, and taking the average value. We refer to this attack as the averaging attack.
To defend against this, Denning et.al. proposed seeding the random number generator with values taken from the query itself. The idea here is that the same query would then produce the same noise. We refer to this general concept of causing noise to repeat as sticky noise. The problem with this particular sticky noise solution, which indeed the authors recognized, is that the analyst can still average out the noise by generating multiple different queries that all produce the same result, for instance by adding conditions that don't effect the answer like WHERE age < 1000. Systems that rely on interpretation of the query syntax, of which Diffix is one, must defend against this sort of attack. We refer to syntax changes that do not result in a change of answer as chaff, and refer to this kind of attack as a chaff attack.
Even in cases where answers cannot be repeated, however, noise may be removed from data. In 2003, Dinur and Nissim showed that the true values of cells in a database may be determined with high confidence even where no query is repeated [5] . They do so by formulating a set of queries where each query selects a different but overlapping set of rows from the database, and computes a noisy sum. They then generate a set of simultaneous equations from the queries, and solve for the values. We refer to this attack as an equations attack.
Two big ideas in data anonymity research are Kanonymity [12] and differential privacy [6] . Neither provides enough utility to be generally and practically usable. The idea behind K-anonymity is that data values are aggregated to the point where any given combination of attributes has at least K distinct individuals sharing the attribute values. Thus any given individual is "hid-den" in a group of at least K individuals. The problem is that applying K-anonymity to all columns destroys the value of the data [2] . Applying K-anonymity to only some columns (i.e. those that can be used to identify the individual), as envisioned by Sweeney, still leaves much data unprotected.
Differential privacy, in a nutshell, protects data by adding random noise. Ultimately it defends against averaging and equations attacks by limiting the number of noisy answers that may be reported to an analyst. This noise budget severely limits the utility of differential privacy. The only two operational deployments of differential privacy that we are aware of, by Google [7] and Apple [13] , both effectively operate with unbounded privacy loss.
Definition and measure of anonymity
The EU Article 29 opinion on anonymity [1] , which serves as the basis for evaluating anonymity in the EU GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), defines three essential risks to anonymization: singling out, linkability, and inference. Article 29 defines these three risks as follows:
Singling out: which corresponds to the possibility to isolate some or all records which identify an individual in the dataset; Linkability: which is the ability to link, at least, two records concerning the same data subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same database or in two different databases). If an attacker can establish (e.g. by means of correlation analysis) that two records are assigned to a same group of individuals but cannot single out individuals in this group, the technique provides resistance against "singling out" but not against linkability;
Inference: which is the possibility to deduce, with significant probability, the value of an attribute from the values of a set of other attributes.
We base our definition of anonymity on these risks, not just because these definitions are used by practitioners, but also because 1) we find them to make sense intuitively, and 2) we can formulate tests that measure the risks. These definitions, however, imply an anonymization system that retains the notion of a "record". Diffix does not anonymize the dataset per se, but rather anonymizes answers to queries on the dataset: the analyst does not have direct access to the dataset and its records ( Figure 2 ). We therefore modify these definitions to fit Diffix's operational model as follows. We define singling out as occurring when an analyst correctly makes a statement of the form "There is exactly one user that has these attributes." For instance, the analyst may claim that there is a single user with attributes [gender = 'male', age = 48, zipcode = 48828, lastname = 'Ng']. If this is true, then the analyst has correctly singled out that user. The attributes dont need to be personal attributes as in this example. If the analyst correctly claims that there is a single person with the geo-location attributes [long = 44.4401, lat = 7.7491, time = '2016-11-28 17:14:22'], then that person is singled out.
We define linkability in the context of a second dataset (the linkability dataset) that has some users in common with the dataset behind Diffix (the protected dataset). In other words, for some fraction of rows in the linkability dataset, there are rows in the protected dataset that belong to the same user.
Assuming that the analyst has full access to the linkability dataset, linkability occurs when an analyst correctly makes a statement of the form "this user or set of users in the linkability dataset also exist in the protected dataset."
We define inference in the context of a second dataset (the inference dataset) which is identical to the protected dataset, but where one or more cells in the inference dataset are masked (the values are unknown to the analyst). Other than this masking, the analyst has full access to the inference dataset.
Inference occurs when an analyst correctly makes a statement of the form "the value of this masked cell in the inference dataset is X".
Of course, some fraction of an analyst's claims may be incorrect. This leads to the notion of confidence, which is defined as the ratio of correct claims to all claims. If 95% of an analysts claims are correct, then the confidence of the attack is 95%. Confidence improvement (or just improvement for short) is the improvement in the analysts confidence over a statistical guess.
By way of example, suppose that roughly 90% of the users in the database have zipcode = 48828, and that the analyst knows this. Suppose also that the analyst has external knowledge that there is a single user with the at-tributes [gender = 'male', age = 48, lastname = 'Ng']. The analyst could simply claim that this users zipcode = 48828, and the analyst would have 90% confidence in the claim. But this does not improve on a statistical guess, and so Diffix has not leaked additional information with respect to the inference. The improvement is therefore zero.
We measure confidence improvement as κ = (C − S)/(1 − S), where C is the analysts confidence, and S is the statistical probability. So for example if the analyst were, through some attack on Diffix, to improve their confidence from 90% to 95%, then the confidence improvement would be κ = 0.5 (or 50%).
The inference and linkability datasets imply some amount of externally derived prior knowledge. Our measure of the quality of Diffix' anonymity accounts for this prior knowledge. Prior knowledge may be gained from external data sources, or the analyst may literally know portions of the database, for instance because a database that the analyst has full access to has been joined with other databases to form the protected database.
We define P as the number of cells an analyst knows as prior knowledge, where a cell is a single value in the database (the value at a single column and row). Of course a cell may itself be a complex object with multiple values, but for our purposes we don't worry about that. For singling out and inference attacks, we define L as the number of cells an analyst learns. For linkability attacks, we define L as the number of row linkages the analyst learns.
This allows us to define α = L/(P + 1) as a value that expresses the strength of Diffix' anonymization (or that of any anonymization scheme) with respect to the analyst's prior knowledge. 1 is added to the denominator to avoid divide-by-zero.
Of course when an analyst "learns" something, it is with a certain confidence improvement κ. Therefore, we characterize the strength of an anonymization scheme with both parameters (α, κ). This strikes us as a reasonable though still flawed way for a privacy stakeholder, for instance a Data Protection Officer (DPO), to think about the value of an anonymization scheme. For instance, suppose that a given system has (α = 10e − 6, κ = 0.9). This means that an attacker must know a million things in order to learn one thing with a 90% confidence improvement. The DPO might or might not regard this as an acceptable risk, but at least the DPO will have some reasonable sense of the risk.
The reality of course is more complex. It may well be that knowing certain cells makes the system more attackable than knowing other cells. For instance, knowing all of a column that on its own isolates many users may be better for an attacker than knowing all of a column that isolates no users. It may also be that, given certain prior knowledge, certain cells are easier to learn than others. The sensitivity of the easier-learned cells may also be a factor.
What's more, an (α, κ) score can only really be measured with respect to some specific attack. A DPO might therefore know be told something like "if an analyst knows columns A and B, and does a foobar attack, then he can learn things about column C with (α = 10e − 7, κ = 0.85)".
Note that our immediate purpose for defining (α, κ) is in order to assign monetary payoffs in a bug bounty challenge. With respect to this paper at least, (α, κ) conveys a sense of how we think about measuring anonymity.
Limitations on GDPR anonymity criteria
Singling out: By our definition, a user is singled out even if an analyst makes a claim about a single cell value, as long as that value isolates the user and is not prior knowledge. There are cases, however, where the analyst may exploit specific patterns in the column data to make successful claims without in fact violating privacy in any meaningful way. Common among these is the case where uid's are assigned sequentially. Since the analyst knows that each uid is distinct, it is quite easy using Diffix to determine that the uid's have been sequentially assigned, and roughly what the low and high uid values are. Given this, the analyst could make a series of singling out claims that there is one user with uid = 1, one user with uid = 2, and so on. Intuitively, we regard this as not violating privacy because it tells us nothing specific about the singled out user-one user could have a given uid as easily as the next.
We have no precise definition of when exploiting such predictable patterns in data are and are not privacy violating. For now we have to take these on a case-by-case basis.
Exposure of strings (security versus privacy): It may be a security violation that any string in a database is revealed. For instance, if a column contains passwords, then it would likely be a security violation that any password is revealed, even if many users happen to have the same password. Neither Diffix nor the GDPR criteria for anonymity account for this requirement. If such a column exists in a database, then it must be removed or made inaccessible by Diffix.
Assumptions and terminology
Our system setup consists of an analyst that queries a database via Diffix (Figure 2 ). The database is conceptually a single table organized as rows and columns. The columns may be of any type, so long as there are equalities and inequalities defined for the type (e.g. column = value or column < value) returning TRUE or FALSE. The database holds "raw" data: no perturbation on the values in the database is assumed, and no columns need be removed 1 , for instance those containing personally identifying information like names.
We refer to the entity whose privacy is being protected as the user. The user may well be a device like a smartphone or a vehicle or even an organization. We require that each database table with individual user data has a column containing user identifiers. This is typically nothing more than the Primary Key or Foreign Key in the relational database. By convention we call this column the uid. We assume that every distinct user has one and only one distinct uid. A user may of course have more than one row.
The database may change over time. However, to protect anonymity in the face of changes, all changes to the database must be timestamped, and all queries must have a time range associated with the query. Note that as of this writing, our implementation of Diffix does not have mechanisms to ensure this.
Diffix must be configured to know 1) which column contains the timestamps, and 2) which column contains the uid's. No other data-specific configuration is required. Critically, the system operator need not understand the semantics or sensitivity of any other columns. This paper assumes that each database table has only a single uid column, and that any given row contains information only about the user identified by the uid. This precludes certain data structures for social network data. For instance a row identifying both the sender and recipient of a message is disallowed. Rather, such a message would have to be encoded as two rows, one for the sender and one for the recipient.
Diffix has no specific mechanisms to deal with perfect correlations between columns among groups of users. If such correlations exist, and there is a risk that an analyst knows of the correlation, then the amount of noise must be increased in proportion to the size of the correlated group. For instance, if 10 people in a geolocation database travel together as a group, then to protect the privacy of all users in the group the noise must be increased 10x. The noise amount is statically configured and applies to all answers.
An analyst may make an unlimited number of queries. This paper does not address timing or other sidechannel attacks. 1 The exception is columns that are a security risk as opposed to a privacy risk, as with the password column example.
Basic Design
A query may have zero or more filter conditions (or just conditions). The conditions determine which rows of the database comprise a given answer. A query may have one or more anonymizing aggregation functions. In our current implementation, these include count, sum, avg, stddev, min, max, and median.
The query produces a response that consists of one or more columns, and zero or more rows or buckets. For example, the following query has two conditions (dept and salary), and one anonymizing aggregation function (count(*)). The response has two columns (salary and count(*)), and multiple buckets (response rows), where each bucket corresponds to a given salary. The dept condition excludes any database rows that don't have a department of 'CS', and the salary condition excludes any database rows from each bucket that do not have the salary corresponding to that bucket. The change in aggregation function value is normally due in part to added pseudo-random noise taken from a Gaussian distribution. It may also in part be because of other mechanisms such as removing outliers from the input data (where input data here refers to the input of the aggregation function, see Figure 3 ). Bucket suppression happens when the input data for any given bucket has too few distinct users. For example, a bucket for the salary $100K that has a true value of 20 users may report a noisy value of 22 users. A bucket for the salary $450K that has only a single user will be completely suppressed.
Sticky Layered Noise
The key concept in Diffix is that of sticky layered noise. Diffix' noise is layered in that a bucket is not distorted by a single noise sample, but rather by the sum of multiple noise samples, where each sample is related to a condition.
Diffix controls how a noise sample is generated by how it seeds the Pseudo-Random Noise Generator (PRNG): the same seed produces the same noise sample. Exactly how a seed is produced depends on the type of condition, but the general idea is to take aspects of the condition itself (the column name, the value, the operator), combine them with a secret salt, and use that as the seed. In fact Diffix has two ways of seeding, or said differently, Diffix has two types of noise. We refer to these as static and dynamic noise. Static noise defends against averaging attacks, and dynamic noise defends against difference attacks (described further in this section).
As an example, the seed for the static noise layer associated with the condition WHERE dept='CS' in the above query is generated as 2 :
The difference between static and dynamic noise layers is that dynamic noise layers additionally include the distinct set of uid's for the users whose rows comprise a given bucket. As such, the seed for the dynamic noise layer for the same condition would be:
Thus static noise layers are static in the sense that the same condition generates the same noise no matter what query it appears in, whereas a dynamic noise layer for a given condition will differ as long as the set of users in the bucket differ. For example, the static noise layers for dept='CS' in the following two queries are the same, while the dynamic noise layers will differ from each other so long as there are CS members younger than 30 or older than 40. For queries that count distinct users, the standard deviation of each noise layer is σ = 1. As a result, a single noise layer taken alone introduces a fair amount of uncertainty as to the exact value of a distinct user count, and multiple noise layers even more so.
Attacks
With sticky layered noise, the simple averaging attack of Section 2 doesn't work because the noise doesn't change with each repeated bucket. The following sections explore additional attacks.
Split Averaging Attack
At this point one might suppose that noise needs to be sticky to prevent the averaging attack, but not necessarily layered. Here we describe a more sophisticated variant of the averaging attack, called the split averaging attack that justifies the need for layers.
In the split averaging attack, the analyst produces the pair of queries shown in Figure 4 .
The sum of the counts of the two queries gives the number of users in the CS department, plus noise (here assuming that there is one row per distinct uid). Now repeat the pair of queries, this time using age=21 and age<>21. This produces the same sum, but with different queries. The pairs can be repeated with age=22,23,24, and so on.
If noise were sticky but not layered, then each individual query would have a different noise sample because each query is different. With enough samples, the noise could be averaged away and a high-confidence exact count produced. Given exact counts, the analyst could then for instance carry out an intersection attack [4] .
With static noise layers, however, the attack doesn't work. Each query has two static noise values: one based on the condition dept='CS', and one based on the age condition (age=XX or age<>XX). The age-based noise value changes with each query, and so could be averaged away. The dept='CS' static noise, however, is always the same and is not averaged away. The final averaged count would be perturbed by the dept='CS' static noise layer. SELECT 
Difference Attack
The split averaging attack explains the need for static noise layers, but not for dynamic noise layers. Indeed in the split averaging attack, all of the dynamic noise layers differ, even the one for dept='CS', because each bucket has a different uid set. Therefore they can also be averaged away and so don't help defend against the split averaging attack. The following attack, called the difference attack, justifies the need for dynamic noise layers.
For this attack, suppose that an analyst happens to know that there is only a single woman in the CS department. Let's call her the victim. The analyst could form the two queries shown in Figure 5 .
Both queries produce a histogram of salary counts. The left query definitely excludes the victim from all answers. The right includes the victim only in the bucket that matches her salary. We refer to this as isolating the victim. Suppose we take the difference in the count between each bucket pair (two buckets representing the same salary). If we only had static noise layers, then this difference would be the same for every pair of buckets for a salary other than that of the victim. This is because the only difference between each such pair would the static noise layer for gender='M', which is always the same. However, the bucket pair representing the victim's salary would have an additional difference: the count of the victim herself. As a result, to discover the victim's salary, the attacker only needs to observe which bucket pair has a unique difference.
The dynamic noise layer defends against this attack. Because the set of uid's differs between pairs of buckets, the difference in noise between each pair also differs. As a result, many pairs would exhibit a different difference, and the attacker would not know with certainty if the difference is due to a different count, or due to the dynamic noise layer.
Equations Attack
The equations attack from Section 2 requires that the amount of noise (the standard deviation of the noise) added to each sum be well below a certain threshold. We assume here that the equations attack also requires that each query has enough conditions to select the specific rows required by the attack: for each selected row, the query has to specify the set of attribute values that uniquely identify that row. Each such attribute value requires a condition, and each condition adds additional noise to the sum. Leaving out the details, in our experiments we found that the equations attack fails because too much noise is added to each sum.
Chaff Attacks
Section 2 briefly described a chaff attack on the simple sticky noise mechanism of Denning et.al. [3] . Because Denning's sticky noise is based on the entire query, the attack only requires the addition, for instance, of a condition that has no effect on the rows in a bucket, i.e. age<>1000, age<>1001 etc. This specific simple chaff attack does not work with sticky layered noise because the additional condition only creates an additional noise layer, and doesn't affect the other noise layers.
The attack on Denning's sticky noise operates by changing the semantics of the query conditions, and exploits the fact that the semantic change happens not to effect the query result. A chaff attack that simply changes the syntax of the query would also work on Denning. For instance, the attacker could make a set of queries each with syntactically different but semantically identical conditions like age=50, age+1=51, age+2=52 and so on.
Whether semantic or syntactic chaff attacks work on Diffix depends entirely on what syntax is allowed in a query, and on how noise layers are computed from that syntax. The Diffix design in [10] specified a very simple syntax, allowing only conditions of the form column operator constant, where the operators were limited to =, <>, >, <, >=, and <=. No math, string or datetime functions, union semantics (OR), or JOIN's among other things were allowed. Those constraints prevented syntactic chaff attacks: the semantics of a given query were always clear and sticky layered noise defended against semantic chaff attacks (to the best of our knowledge).
The design of Diffix in this paper allows a much richer subset of SQL, and therefore a much larger attack vector for chaff attacks. Chaff attacks are informally (and incompletely) addressed in other parts of this paper.
Bucket Suppression
Learning the strings or values that exist in a database is very useful. Simply listing a column's values, however, violates singling out when any of the values belong to a single user. Therefore we wish to suppress any response where a value represented by a single user.
A simple mechanism for this would be to have a threshold for the number of distinct users that comprise a given bucket below which the bucket is suppressed.
We need to take care, however, that the suppression or lack thereof doesn't itself constitute a signal that might allow an analyst to obtain individual user information. For instance, a simple hard threshold, whereby all buckets with fewer than exactly K distinct users is suppressed, can leak the presence of absence of a specific user in the case where the analyst knows that there are either K or K − 1 users with a given value. This Kth user is singled out in this case.
To avoid this, we use what we call a noisy threshold. This is a threshold whose value for any given bucket comes from a Gaussian distribution around a mean threshold. The noisy threshold used for bucket suppression, which we refer to as the low-count threshold, operates as follows.
If the number of distinct uid's in the bucket is less than T h = 2, then suppress the bucket. Otherwise, seed a sticky noise value T n with mean µ = 4 and standard deviation σ = 0.5 using the distinct uid's from the bucket:
If the number of distinct uid's in the bucket is less than T n , then suppress the bucket.
These specific values for µ, σ , and T h are a matter of policy. It is overall good to ensure that the mean µ is three or four standard deviations from the hard threshold T h so that the hard threshold is rarely actually invoked and therefore can't somehow be exploited. At the same time, it is safer to have a larger σ , which then implies a larger mean. Unfortunately, the larger the mean, the more suppression. Often columns have a lot of distinct values that are populated by very few individuals, and much of this information can disappear when µ is too large. In addition, almost invariably analyst's like to look at small groups, and so µ plays in important role in how fine-grained the analysis can be. Therefore, we select relatively small values for µ, σ , and T h .
Baseline Noise and Noisy Threshold
The anonymizing aggregation functions use sticky layered noise it two ways: to add noise to the final answer, and to select groups of users using a noisy threshold. For both uses, Diffix uses noise from the summed static and dynamic noise layers described above. Specifically, Diffix produces a baseline noise value N b from which other noise values are derived as needed.
The mean of the baseline noise N b is µ base = 0, and its standard deviation is σ base = 1. If a different mean or standard deviation is required for a given purpose, then the baseline noise is simply multiplied by a factor to obtain the required standard deviation, and the mean is adjusted accordingly. Figure 6 : Difference attack to learn whether the isolated woman has had a disciplinary warning given that she has a high salary.
For all of the noisy threshold uses in the anonymizing aggregation functions, the hard threshold is set to T h = 2, and the noise value is set to N b /2 + 4 (mean of 4).
Anonymizing Aggregation Functions
Diffix currently implements the following anonymizing aggregation functions: count, sum, avg, stddev, min, max, and median. Each of these functions has a specific anonymization method that trades off the desire to minimize distortion against the goal of ensuring that the effect of any one individual in the bucket cannot be easily detected.
The functions count, sum, avg, and stddev are treated rather differently than the functions min, max, and median. This is because the former functions compute a value that is a composite of all values, whereas the latter functions compute a value that belongs to only a single user.
count, sum, avg, and stddev
The anonymization of these four functions are all based on that of sum. count is a sum of rows. avg is sum divided by count. stddev is ultimately derived from the avg function. Specifically for each row stddev computes the square of the difference between each value and the true average. It then computes the (anonymized) avg of these differences, and reports the square root of this avg.
There are two important but contradictory considerations to make when computing the anonymized sum. On the one hand, the amount of noise needs to be proportional to the largest contribution of any user. This is to protect against the case where a difference attack can isolate a user that contributes an unusually large amount to the sum.
For instance, consider the attack of Figure 6 which isolates the one woman in the CS department and tries to learn if she has had a disciplinary warning. She is excluded from the left query and included in the right if she has had a warning. Suppose that the amount of noise added is proportional not to the largest salary but to the average salary. Suppose also that the woman's salary is substantially higher than the average, say $400K versus $125K. If the difference between the reported sums is around $400K or higher, then with very high probability the woman is present in the right-hand query and therefore has had a warning. This high probability comes from the fact that $400K is more than three standard deviations from $125K, so the probability that the difference is due purely to noise and not the contribution of the woman's salary to the sum is very small. On the other hand, making the noise proportional to the largest value causes a problem when that value is an outlier. For instance, suppose instead that the woman's $400K salary in the attack of Figure 6 is twice that of the next highest salary, and that the analyst knows this fact. Now suppose that the reported sum of the right-hand query is $800K greater than that of the left-hand query. If the woman is present in the right-hand query, then this difference is due to her salary being included plus one standard deviation of noise. If the woman is not present in the right-hand query, then the difference would be due to four standard deviations of noise, a very low probability. Therefore the analyst can conclude with high probability that the woman has had a warning.
Therefore, to effectively hide any given user in a sum, it is necessary to first remove outliers, and then add noise proportional to the remaining highest values. Simply removing outliers, however, results in more distortion than necessary. Instead, we flatten the values of a few distinct users with the highest values (group 1 in Figure 7 so that they are comparable to those of the next few distinct users with the highest values (group 2).
The sum (and count) function has two phases, a preprocessing phase and a summing phase. The input to the summing phase is: Depending on the function, the pre-processing phase produces the value as follows: If there are both positive and negative values, then the above computations are done separately for the positive and negative values, using lowest values instead of highest. The actual added noise is the sum of the two noise values.
As described above, both the count(distinct column) and sum(distinct column) functions remove duplicate values during pre-processing. Duplicates are removed in such a way as to maximize the resulting number of distinct uid's. This minimizes the contribution of any given user, allowing Diffix to minimize the noise.
Note that in the case of count(distinct uid), there is no distortion due to flattening. All values are 1, so the replacement in step 5 has no effect.
The reason in step 7 for computing the noise N as proportional the max of the average of all values A all or one half the average of group 2 A 2 is to further lower the amount of noise in the case where the highest values are substantially higher than the average value. The premise here is that if the large values are substantially higher than the average, then there is some spread in the values contributed by different users, and therefore some uncertainty on the part of the analyst as to how much any given user is contributing to the sum. This uncertainty then reduces the need for the uncertainty inherent in the noise. This is admittedly at this time an unfounded premise, and more experimentation is needed to ensure that the premise is correct.
min, max, and median
Since min and max in principle could report the value of an individual user, it is particularly important that the effect of extreme values are hidden. Diffix removes noisy threshold numbers of distinct users from both the high and low end of the value range (see Figure 8) . The average value of the next highest (lowest) noisy threshold number of distinct users are then used to compute max (min). Similarly, the median is computed from the average of the values of a noisy threshold number of distinct users above and below the true median.
Once the highest and lowest value are removed, max is computed as follows: The computation of the noise amount in step 4 needs some explanation. N b is the noise value generated from the baseline noise. If all the values in the group are the same, then the standard deviation of the group is zero, and there is no noise added. In this case, the exact value of the group is reported. This is safe, because the group represents multiple distinct users and so any one user is hidden in the crowd. Furthermore, the analyst does not know how many users constitute the group. Indeed, if all the values in the averaged group and the removed group are identical, then max or min will report the correct true max or min.
If however, the values of the group are different, then we add a little noise to help ensure that the analyst cannot somehow reverse engineer the specific values in the group from the exact average A 2 . In fact, we don't have evidence that this reverse engineering would be possible, but neither do we have evidence that it is not. So the noise is a fudge factor. With experimentation, we may find that it is not needed, or for that matter that it should be larger.
median
Like min and max, median can report the value of a single user, and can report the correct true median. Also like min and max, the values for the highest and lowest distinct users are first removed for computing median (see Figure 8 ). After that removal, the algorithm is as follows:
1. Order the rows from highest to lowest values.
Generate a noisy threshold T (see Section 5.4).
3. Select the true median row and label it. 4. Label the rows for the T distinct users above the true median, and the T distinct users below the true median (the same user may appear once above and once below). 5. Compute A as the average of the labeled rows. 6. Compute σ as the standard deviation of the labeled rows. 7. The anonymized median value is computed as A with added noise (N b * σ )/8. Figure 9 illustrates an example query in Diffix. The analyst requests the sum of salaries with two conditions (on columns dept and gender). Diffix processes the query, both to ensure that it conforms to the SQL restrictions placed by Diffix, and to modify the query so that the data required for anonymization is retrieved from the database. Both the low-count threshold and the anonymized sum function require the list of uid's, and the sum function additional requires the list of salary values. As a result, the query is modified so as to request this data from the database. (Note that this is somewhat a simplification of what happens in our implementation.)
An Example
The contents of the uid column are used to generate the uid-seed for the low-count threshold check as well as for the dynamic noise layers. The low-count threshold check determines whether the bucket needs to be suppressed.
In this particular example, the seeds for the layered noise can be generated from examining the SQL itself. Two static and dynamic noise layers are generated, one each for the two conditions. 
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Details
The previous section describes the basic concepts of Diffix, giving examples for queries with simple conditions: AND'd conditions in a WHERE clause with no math or other functions. With the exception of a few updates, the concepts and examples essentially cover the material described in [10] . This section describes how Diffix is applied to a much richer SQL syntax.
The complete syntax is specified in Appendix A. Note that this syntax represents not what is possible with Diffix, but what has been implemented so far. As such, the term "Diffix" may be thought of as a framework including for instance the concepts of sticky layered noise and the low-count threshold. Any given implementation of Diffix may have more or less functionality.
There are a number of restrictions on how the syntax specified in Appendix A may be used. As a rule, the purpose of these restrictions is to prevent an attacker from either generating conditions that Diffix does not recognize as conditions, or generating conditions whose semantics Diffix mis-interprets.
An example of the latter is given in Section 5.2.4, where for instance the conditions WHERE age=20, WHERE age+1=21, WHERE age+2=22 etc. are all semantically identical and so must produce the same noise layer.
An example of the former is the query shown in Figure 11 , where the two queries both provide row counts of users age 30 or 40, but where the upper query has no explicit condition at all. We refer to attacks that emulate conditions without Diffix realizing it as backdoor attacks.
These restrictions are described throughout this section.
Terminology
A positive condition is one that includes rows that match the condition. For instance,
WHERE column = value WHERE column IN (values) WHERE column LIKE value
A negative condition is one that excludes rows that match the condition. For instance,
WHERE column <> value WHERE column NOT IN (values) WHERE column NOT LIKE value
An equality is a condition that requires an exact match to include or exclude rows. The version of Diffix in this paper has equality operators = and <>.
An inequality is a condition with operators like less than or greater than. Diffix places a restriction on inequalities in that the inequalities must express a range: both lower and upper inequality boundaries must be specified. Thus the condition WHERE age BETWEEN 10 AND 20 is allowed, but the condition WHERE age < 20 is not allowed. Both positive and negative ranges may be expressed (i.e. BETWEEN and NOT BETWEEN).
A query condition may be clear or unclear. Simply put, a clear condition is one where Diffix understands the intent of the condition and can therefore derive the condition's noise layers directly by examining the SQL. What passes as clear therefore depends on the sophistication of the Diffix SQL compiler (see Section 6.2 below). condition must either be the native column, or a native column being operated on by one of the following string operations: right, left, ltrim, rtrim, btrim, trim, substring, upper, or lower. To be considered clear, the condition must also have a simple constant (not operated on by math or any function). The upper four queries of Figure 10 are clear, while the bottom two are not.
Current scope of clear queries
The reason we specifically allow the string functions is because in our experience it is quite common for analysts to select sub-strings from a string. This is because strings frequently have an internal structure that the analyst wants to deconstruct (for instance a date encoded as a string, as in the example of Figure 10 ). In so doing we are conceptually treating the substring as a separate column. Nevertheless, when there is one of these string functions present, Diffix adds an extra noise layer to defend against potential attacks that try to exploit the function (Sections 6.13 and 6.14).
Diffix supports use of the HAVING clause in subqueries. A HAVING clause necessarily implies an aggregation function and associated GROUP BY which must operate on the uid. Queries where this is not the case are rejected. The rules for when a HAVING clause is clear in the current implementation are the same as for the WHERE clause, with the exception that an aggregation function is allowed, and the constraint that the aggregation function must operate on a raw column value. For example, neither query of Figure 12 is considered clear. (Both would be clear if the +20 was removed.)
AND'd conditions
In the current implementation of Diffix, the OR operation is not allowed. There is no fundamental reason for this. Indeed the IN operation, which has union semantics, is allowed.
A Diffix query consists of the intersection of a set of conditions, where the condition operators may be =, BETWEEN (or the equivalent pair of inequalities), IN FROM table  FROM table  GROUP BY uid GROUP BY uid HAVING mxage+20 = 65)t HAVING mxage = 65)t GROUP BY mxage GROUP BY mxage Figure 12 : Neither of these queries are clear, because of the math. Both would be clear if the +20 were removed.
SELECT age, salary, count(*)
SELECT count (*)  FROM table  FROM table  GROUP BY age, salary WHERE age = 20 AND salary = 100000 Figure 13 : Selected columns are implicitly AND'd positive conditions, and are treated as such for the purpose of seeding noise layers. The bucket produced by the lefthand query where age=20 and salary=100000 is seeded identically to that of the right-hand query.
SELECT age SELECT age, count(*) FROM A Diffix query may have zero or more conditions. If a query has zero conditions, then a single dynamic noise layer is used. The seed components in this case consist of the table name, the hashed and XOR'd uid's, and the secret salt.
When columns are selected, they are treated as positive AND'd conditions for the purpose of seeding noise layers. For instance, the left-hand query from Figure 13 generates a set of buckets, one for each unique pair of age and salary. For each pair of values, noise layers are seeded as though those values appeared in a WHERE clause (i.e. the query on the right).
Note that selected columns do not require an associated anonymizing aggregation function. For instance, the query on the left-hand side of Figure 14 is valid. In this case, however, for the purpose of anonymization the query is treated as though the count(*) anonymizing aggregation function were present. The only difference is in the layout of the query answer. For example, the answer to the right-hand query of Figure 14 would have a single row for each age. If the noisy count for age=20 from the right-hand query were 86, then the left-hand query would simply produce 86 rows each with age=20.
Floating versus SQL Inspection
In Figure 9 , Diffix is shown as requesting the uid column from the database in order to compute the uid seed component of the dynamic noise layers. We refer to this mechanism of requesting a column as floating the column. Every query requires that at least the uid column is floated. In the example of Figure 9 , however, the other seed components are generated simply by inspecting the SQL itself. This is possible because the conditions in the query are clear.
SELECT count(*)
SELECT uid, age FROM table  FROM table  WHERE age+1 = 26 WHERE age+1 = 26
Figure 15: Because the condition is unclear, Diffix extracts and examines (floats) the column contents to derive the value seed component. When the analyst submits the left-hand query, Diffix transforms it to the righthand query to extract the age column (and uid column) from the database. There are cases, however, where the seed components cannot be derived from SQL inspection alone. One such case is that of selected columns being treated as implicit positive AND'd conditions as shown in Figure 13 . The selected columns are floated and the values returned by the database are inspected and used as seed components.
Another example is where conditions are unclear. For instance, in the left-hand query of Figure 15 , the condition WHERE age+1=26 is unclear because of the math. In this case, the age column is floated (along with the uid column) in order to compute the seed components of the noise layers for the age condition (right-hand query). In this case, the floated value for age used in the seed would be 25, which indeed captures the "intent" of the condition. Floating gives the analyst access to a variety of math, string, and datetime operations while preventing chaff attacks that exploit those operations.
In the case of a sub-query with a GROUP BY, the raw column cannot be floated because it no longer exists after the aggregation function. For instance in the left-hand query of Figure 16 , the avg function in the sub-query transforms the individual rows into aggregate rows. It is therefore no longer possible to float the individual rows and use their values for seeding.
One way to deal with this would be to somehow incorporate the aggregation function into the seed. For instance, for the left-hand query of Figure 16 , the noise layer could additionally be seeded by the name of the aggregation function. The problem with this is that sev-eral aggregation functions can produce the same results. In any column where there is one row per distinct user, then min, max, avg, and median for instance all produce the same value. This allows the analyst to get four noise samples and so is a chaff attack, albeit limited by the number of different aggregation functions.
Rather, Diffix floats pre-specified aggregates, specifically min, max, and count, and uses the associated values in the seed. Pre-specified aggregates are chosen so that the analyst cannot influence what gets floated. These three particular aggregates are chosen because they work with numeric, text, and datetime column types, and at the same time provide good "coverage" of the column contents.
The specific attack on HAVING that we want to avoid is one where the analyst isolates a user with two queries in such a way that the seeds for the noise layers associated with the aggregated column are the same. This could happen if the only difference between the two queries is the choice of aggregation function, the two aggregation functions change only a single row (that of the victim), but at the same time does not change the min, max, or count for the victim. While theoretically possible, we take it as a given that the probability of this occurring (and the analyst knowing it occurs) is negligible and does not need to be defended against.
Positive equality
Positive equalities are allowed. Positive equalities do not need to be clear. The seed components for the static noise layer, not including the salt, are: [table_name, column_name, value, value, 1] If the condition is clear, then the value is simply extracted from the SQL and used to seed the noise layer. The same seed components are used whether the condition is in a WHERE or a HAVING clause. If the condition is not clear, then the column, or in the case of HAVING its min/max/count aggregates, is floated and the value is taken from the database.
The reason that the value is repeated, and the 1 included, can be explained as follows. Suppose that only a single instance of the value was used (i.e. [value] instead of [value,value,1] as is the case in the simplified seed description from Section 5.1, where value='CS'). Suppose further than the table has one row per user. In that case, the analyst could compose a query containing an unclear HAVING that forces Diffix to float max/max/count aggregate values rather than the native column values. This would produce a seed that is different from that produced with the corresponding WHERE clause, thus giving the analyst another random sample. By using [value,value,1] instead of [value] , the same seed results whether the analyst uses an unclear HAVING or a WHERE clause.
The seed for the dynamic layer of course additionally contains the XOR'd hashes of the uid's. For brevity, in what follows unless otherwise specified we exclude the secret salt, table name, and column name from the specification of the static seed components, and additionally exclude the XOR'd hashes of uid's from the specification of the dynamic seed components.
Negative equality
Negative equalities are allowed. Negative equalities must always be clear (in our current implementation). Examples of queries with negative equalities are the following:
SELECT sum(salary) FROM The difficulty with generating seeds for negative conditions in general is that floating the column from the query as-is does not tell Diffix what the condition is excluding, but rather what happens to be included. In other words, SQL inspection of the condition WHERE age<>64 tells Diffix what the condition excludes, while floating of the age column tells Diffix what is included as a result of the negative condition.
To use floating (and therefore allow unclear conditions), Diffix would have to reverse the condition (change it from negative to positive), and probe the database with the modified query to determine what the condition is meant to exclude. For instance, the unclear condition on the left query below would be changed to the unclear condition on the right. An initial probe query would be made floating the age column. The value returned by the database would be 65, and this could then be used to seed the noise layer.
SELECT count(*) SELECT count(*) FROM The decision to not implement a probing approach is simply one of prioritization. There is extra overhead (the additional query) and extra complexity. Given that in the future we can expand the set of queries that are clear with a smarter SQL compiler, the question of whether it is worth implementing a probing approach is still uncertain.
The seed components for the static noise layer include: [value] Note that here there is no need to replicate the value and include 1. This is because there is no floating, and so never a need to float min/max/count.
Positive range
Inequalities must always be expressed as ranges. So the condition WHERE age BETWEEN 10 and 20 is allowed (or the equivalent using >= and <=), but WHERE age <= 20 alone (without a corresponding >=) is not allowed. The reason for this restriction is because of snapped alignment. Inequalities in Diffix are forced into a predetermined (snapped) set of exponentially growing range sizes and offsets [10] . Numbers fall on intuitive boundaries like 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 etc., and datetimes fall on natural boundaries (second, hour, day etc.) and intuitive sub-boundaries. Simply put, in order to for a snapped size to be enforced, both edges of a range must be specified by the analyst.
Ranges must be clear. The seed components for the static noise layer include: [lower_value, upper_value] Note that if >=, <= syntax is used, then two conditions are treated as one.
The reason for snapped alignment is to prevent chaff attacks whereby the analyst repeats a series of queries, each with a slightly larger range, but in such a way that the small range change does not change the set of rows filtered by the condition. As a simple example, if the analyst knows that a given numerical column contains integers, the analyst could increase the range by increments of 0.01, thus obtaining many noise samples to average out.
As of this writing, we have no good ideas on how to allow unclear range queries. Unlike equalities, a range naturally allows a variety of different values to pass (those that fall in the range). If Diffix could deduce from floating the range's column what the intended range is, then Diffix could 1) ensure that the range is snapped, and 2) use the range to seed the associated noise layers. The problem is that it is hard to deduce the intended range. For instance, suppose that Diffix observes values between 2 and 9 from floating the column. Diffix cannot tell if the specified unclear range in the query is 0-10 and therefore properly snapped, or 2-9 and therefore not snapped, or even 0-20 because the range is properly snapped but just happens to have no values between 10 and 20.
Negative range
Negative ranges (i.e. NOT BETWEEN) are allowed. Negative ranges must of course also be clear. The seed components are identical to those for positive ranges, but with the addition of a symbol denoting that the range is negative: The IN clause must be clear. There are two ways in which an analyst could attempt a difference attack based on the IN clause. One is to remove the entire clause. Another is to remove or change one or more of the elements within the IN. As such, there are noise layers associated with the entire clause (the perclause noise layers), and a noise layer associated with each element (the per-element noise layers).
Regarding the per-clause layer, Diffix creates a static noise layer (no dynamic layer) by floating the associated column. The noise layers are seeded with the following components:
Where val1, val2 etc. are the floated column values. Note that if the IN clause has only a single element then it is treated identically to the corresponding positive equality (Section 6.5).
The reason that the IN column is floated, even though it is clear, is to defend against an averaging attack using chaff elements. For instance, if Diffix used SQL inspection to compose the per-clause noise layer, the analyst could submit a series of queries with age IN (50,1000), age IN (50,1001), etc.
Regarding the per-element noise layers, Diffix generates a dynamic noise layer for each element (no static layer). The seed components include: [value] where value is the element itself. The reason we don't require a per-clause dynamic noise layer is because any one of the per-element dynamic noise layers is effective in defending against a difference attack based on removing the clause.
The reason we don't require a per-element static noise layer is because a set of per-element static noise layers, when summed together, behaves like a per-group static noise layer, but with more noise (a higher standard deviation). By having a single per-clause static noise layer, we reduce the total amount of noise.
NOT IN clause
A NOT IN clause is equivalent to a set of AND'd negative equalities. For example, the following two queries are equivalent. SELECT Recognizing this, Diffix treats any NOT IN clause as its equivalent set of AND'd negative equality conditions (Section 6.6).
LIKE clause
The LIKE and ILIKE clauses enable a difference attack whereby a victim is isolated by exploiting a unique string associated with the victim. For example, suppose that the database has a column name consisting of last names. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. The analyst has prior knowledge of the name column, 2. the column contains a number of Murry's (enough to avoid low-count filtering), 3. the column contains a single McMurry, 4. the column contains no other last names that end with Murry.
Under these conditions, the analyst could execute the difference attack on the victim McMurry with the queries shown in Figure 17 . The left-hand query excludes McMurry while the right-hand query includes him or her because of the '%' wildcard symbol which matches on any zero or more of any character. As a result, whichever bucket matches McMurry's gender will contain McMurry. LIKE also permits the ' ' wildcard, which matches on exactly one of any character.
Note that, at least with last names, the conditions for this attack exist surprisingly often. For instance, in a database of 250K last names with a distribution published by the US census, 0.2% of the names had the attack condition. Similar results were measured for Twitter hashtags.
Diffix defends against this form of difference attack by more-or-less creating a noise layer per wildcard in the LIKE expression. The reason we do it this way, rather than try to create a single noise layer from the complete set of wildcards, is that it is too easy for an analyst to create chaff wildcard expressions otherwise. For instance, the expressions 'Mur y', 'Murr ', 'Mu%rry' etc. might all filter the same rows. If we had a single noise layer per expression each seeded differently, then the noise could be averaged out.
In creating the noise layers, we want to try to best capture the role that each wildcard plays in the expression. Note in particular that the '%' wildcard can often be inserted anywhere without having any effect on the filtered rows. For instance, suppose that the analyst wants to do the condition col LIKE 'abc de', but would like to average away the noise layer associated with the ' ' wildcard using chaff. The analyst could try '%abc de', '%a%bc de', '%ab%%c de', etc. It could well be that none of the '%' wildcards have any effect, but each new combination for instance pushes the ' ' wildcard into a different string index position. Therefore we want to ensure that this kind of chaff attack also doesn't work.
Our solution is to use the index position of the wildcard symbol to seed its associated noise layer, but to ignore '%' symbols when determining the index position. We also automatically ignore any repeated '%' symbols, since such symbols have no effect on the operation of the LIKE. The creation of the noise layers then takes the following steps: As a result of this algorithm, the three expressions '%abc de', '%a%bc de', and '%ab%%c de' all compute the same noise layer for the ' ' symbol because the index position is always derived from the base string 'abc de'. The apparnetly unavoidable downside of this approach is that it can create a lot of noise layers. Analysts must be aware of this and strive not to include unnecessary wildcards in LIKE expressions.
The LIKE clause must be clear.
NOT LIKE clause
The NOT LIKE and NOT ILIKE clauses must also be clear.
NOT LIKE is seeded identically to LIKE, with the exception that the :not symbol is included as a seed component.
Character removing string functions
The current implementation of Diffix supports a number of string functions that can remove characters from the string. They include right, left, ltrim, rtrim, btrim, trim, and substring. All of these functions may appear in positive and negative conditions, including those that are otherwise clear. As a result, attacks similar to those for LIKE may be executed. For instance, the condition WHERE right(name,5) = 'Murry', which strips all characters but the last five, matches both Murry and McMurry. As another example, if a first name column contained multiple Paul's but only one Paula, then both substring(name FROM 0 FOR 4)='paul' and WHERE left(name,4)='Paul'. can be used to match both names.
For conditions containing these functions, an extra noise layer is created for the function. For example, given the condition WHERE right(name,5)<>'Murry', the noise layers that would normally be created from the condition WHERE name<>'Murry' would be created, and in addition a dynamic noise layer specifically associated with the right function would be created.
This extra dynamic noise layer has the following seed components:
• The function name • The constant (or constants, in the case of substring) associated with the function (i.e. the number 5 in the case of right(name,5)) • The symbol :<> if a negative condition
In the case of trim, we use ltrim, rtrim, or btrim as the function name depending on whether the trim is LEADING, TRAILING, or BOTH.
In the case of substring(col FOR X) or substring(col FROM 0 FOR X), then we treat it as the equivalent left(col, X) with respect to seeding.
The constant for the trim's needs to be normalized so that the analyst can't add chaff and average out the noise by for instance scrambling the characters or adding extra redundant characters. To do this, we remove redundant characters and put the characters in alpha-numeric order.
String functions lower and upper
The current implementation also supports the string functions lower and upper. While these to our knowledge cannot be used in a difference attack, without additional noise layers they could in many cases be used in a limited chaff attack to obtain three static noise samples for the same query. For instance, suppose that the first letter of last names is capitalized. The analyst could obtain three noise samples with the following three conditions: WHERE name <> 'Smith' WHERE upper(name) <> 'SMITH' WHERE lower(name) <> 'smith'
When upper or lower appears in a positive equality or with the IN comparator, then nothing special is required to seed the associated noise layers. The column is floated (prior to the case change) and handled as usual.
When they appear in a condition that does not float (negative equality or NOT IN) then an extra static noise layer is generated. This noise layer is the same regardless of whether the analyst executes upper or lower: Diffix forces the string to lower case for the purpose of seeding the noise layer. As such, seed components include:
[lower(value), ':<>', ':lower'] where lower(value) is the string in lower case, and :lower is an extra symbol.
Functions that produce ranges
There are a number of functions that, when combined with a condition, effectively produce ranges. For instance, Figure 18 show how trunc and year mimic the corresponding ranges specified with BETWEEN. These include all of the datetime functions in Appendix B.2, and the math functions trunc and round.
Without getting into details, our implementation recognizes these functions and associated conditions as requiring the same noise layers as their explicit counterparts. Note that all of the functions listed above are "naturally" snapped. trunc and round operate on powers of 10 (0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, ...), and with the exception of weekday and quarter, the datetime functions operate on the same natural datetime boundaries as Diffix' snapped alignment. Note that strictly speaking there are other math functions like floor and ceil, and even casting a real to an int, that also can generate ranges. These, however, only operate at the level of single integers, and so we feel provide inadequate expressiveness from which to effectively be used for attacks. Figure 19 : The concat function can be used to mimic positive AND'd conditions. The above queries produce identical buckets.
Function concat
Our implementation of Diffix allows the function concat. concat can be used to mimic AND'd positive conditions. For instance, the two queries in Figures 19 produce the same buckets.
Without getting into detail, our Diffix implementation floats the columns used by concat and generates noise layers identical to those produced by positive AND'd conditions.
Noise reporting functions
In order to help the analyst gauge the accuracy of query results, Diffix provides a number of functions that report the amount of the added noise (the standard deviation). Especially for functions that report sums or the count of rows, the amount of noise may vary substantially since it is proportional to the contribution of some of the largest users. These functions are count noise, sum noise, avg noise, and stddev noise.
Since the noise amount is itself based on values from multiple distinct users, we do not expect it to be attackable. Never-the-less, to stay on the safe side, the reported noise is a rounded value. The unit of rounding increases with the size of the standard deviation such that the rounded value is within roughly 5% of the true value.
